Phil Gramm has an editorial in today’s Wall Street Journal that manages to shed blame in a bunch of different directions, while notably ignoring the giant role that he played in today’s problems.
While it must be nice that he can continue to find a worldwide audience for his views, let me just offer one bit of opinion: maybe Phil Gramm is a little bit off.
You know that something is up when there is a picture of Bill Clinton signing the “Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999.”
Notably missing is a caption that recognizes that legislation by its more common name – The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Again, this act passed by a party line vote of 54 to 44 in the Senate.
And gee, who is this Gramm? Right, Phil Gramm, former Senator from Texas and now a board member of massive financial behemoth UBS. Of course, there he is, standing up on the center-left part of the photograph, next to Alan Greenspan.
Let’s not get into Phil Gramm’s comments about what he thinks of his fellow Americans, or what possible role UBS has played in the current crisis through its massive hedge fund and investment bank platform.
Gramm’s editorial then proceeds through a series of tricky logic games that are as much artful dodge as they are an attempt at policy. First, he defends the bill that is known by his name, GLB, for its value in repealing the Glass-Steagall Act. GLB was hardly just about “deregulation,” and certainly not at the level of individual mortgages. It’s principal impact was to remove firewalls between banks, insurance companies, and securities firms. Without G-L-B:
- There could never have been an AIG as we knew it, at least not the kind of firm that lost $10 billion on exotic trades out of one office in London.
- There never could have been a Merrill Lynch that was originating tons of subprime mortgages.
- Bank of America wouldn’t have been reporting quarterly losses in the billions over collateralized debt obligations and structured investment vehicles.
But to Gramm, that is almost an afterthought, because his analysis goes no deeper than to ruminate on the lack of damning evidence against “deregulation.” After all, he says, there was no Glass-Steagall in Europe and there was no financial disaster then, either. He did not mention that Zimbabwe has little financial regulation, (oh, and a lot of inflation) either, but I guess he just didn’t want to include all of the deregulated economies in the world.
Gramm manages to suggest that the Community Reinvestment Act is one of the architects of this crisis. Again, its faulty logic. What he is saying is not that CRA loans went bad, but that the mere existence of the loans gave the lenders “an excuse and regulatory cover.”
Now, mind you, we’re in a period where GLB has given us “deregulation,” but I guess if you are having it both ways, then have it both ways. Some good analysis (by Republicans, too), both here and here, shows that CRA loans are not the root cause of the CRA crisis. Randall Krosner, a Bush appointee and a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, points out that only 6 percent of “higher-priced” loans went to low-income borrowers by CRA-regulated banks.
CRA loans were designed to be sustainable, and by their very nature, they didn’t have the exotic option-ARM and interest-only features that led to so many foreclosures. Gramm is talking, but he isn’t saying anything.