Edmund Andrew’s story about his own foreclosure and subsequent bankruptcy is illuminating.
Andrews is the economic reporter for the New York Times. He has covered the rise and fall of mortage markets in our country since the beginning of the decade. He gave some warnings to readers about the situation. He should have known better.
Andrews mentions that he was earning $120,000 per year. His new wife also was making a second, albeit much more pedestrian, salary. She was probably making less than $30,000 in retail at a clothing store. Nonetheless, they had a pretty good income. Andrews’ only thorn was a $4,700 per month alimony payment.
As he recounts, he qualified for a $500,000 mortgage with American Home Mortgage. They didn’t check out his cash flow. They didn’t want to know that he was giving away about half of his after-tax take home pay to his wife. They did notice that he had a second mortgage out, on his former home with his first wife, but that just meant that he would get a slightly higher interest rate. He got a high-cost stated-income loan with almost 100 percent loan-to-value. And, it carried an adjustable rate...doomed to reset in five years.
Well, it caught up with Andrews in a few years. He had to refinance, but into a much higher interest rate loan.
What was really unbelievable was the incentives that faced him when it came time to deal with a loan in default. As JP Morgan Chase, his loan servicer, explained it was not possible to modify his loan while he was current on his payments. If he fell behind 90 days, then his loan would go to a different department. Then it would be up for a mod, but it would probably be modified with no change in the principle due. Monthly payments would probably increase.
These incentives are unfortunately all too normal. A professor at Valparaiso determined that while there were many modifications taking place, that as many as half resulted in a higher monthly payment for borrowers. The logic of that is impossible to understand. It would seem that all of the efforts, which are difficult and require the participation of many institutions, are only leading to more situations that will end up in foreclosure.
Sheila Bair has some good ideas, but she is being countered by the big banks and some of the other regulatory institutions. For example, a study jointly authored by the OTS and the OCC points out that many loan modifications aren’t working. They indicate that many are occuring. Their lead comment is somewhat naive:
“Consistent with last quarter’s findings, the report also showed that re-default rates on modified mortgages were both high and rising during the first three quarters of 2008, with loans modified in the third quarter showing the highest re-default rates. For example, the percentage of modified loans that were seriously delinquent (60 or more days past due) after eight months was 41 percent for loans modified in the first quarter and 46 percent for loans modified in the second quarter.”
Then they note that one possible reason could be that most mortgages are getting these higher monthly payments. Gee…what an interesting finding!